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When I learned that the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission had decided
to provide judges with information comparing the financial costs and recidivism risks of
several different sentencing options in a particular case, I did not ask: “Why would they
do this? How could they take such an ill-chosen path?” Instead, I asked: “Why did it
take so long?”
I welcome, and indeed applaud, the refinement that the Sentencing Advisory
Commission has imported into the sentencing structure in Missouri. To me, it is time to
consider next how we can build upon this reform initiative and transplant it, with
dispatch, across the country. But I have found that there are those, including individuals
whom I deeply respect, who are resistant to this change – those who, by all appearances,
want to keep us in the “same ole, same ole” sentencing box in which uninformed, and
sometimes misinformed, sentencing decision making is the norm. So it is advisable, in
my opinion, to take some time to respond briefly to the concerns they have proffered
about the provision of comparative cost-risk information to judges and the factoring of
that information into their sentencing decisions.
I have set forth below some of the primary reasons why I believe the institution of
the practice of allowing judges access to some very basic facts about the financial cost of
several sentencing options they are mulling over and their effects, in terms of recidivism
reduction, is not only appropriate, but laudable.
1. Judges already engage in cost-benefit assessments, though typically crude
ones, when imposing sentences. To suggest that the consideration by judges of the
relative costs and risks of varying sentences is radical and unseemly is, first, to ignore the
reality that judges already do this every day. Judges often grapple, for example, with
such questions as what sentence would be most effectual and advisable for a burglar or
chronic thief who committed a crime to secure money to support a drug habit. The
judges are trying to determine, as best they can, whether society’s interests, including its
interest in being protected from future crimes, would be best served by a community
sanction combined with drug treatment or, alternatively, by a period of incarceration.
The judges are, in short, undertaking a cost-benefit analysis.
2. Judges should engage in cost-benefit assessments as part of the sentencing
decision-making process. Not only do judges already weigh, though roughly, costs, risks,
and benefits when rendering sentencing decisions, but they also should engage in this
kind of reflective, rather than reflexive, decision making. Let me offer a medical analog.
As a doctor is determining the optimal way to respond to a medical problem, who would
protest if the doctor considered the full range of treatment options available, including the
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risks, costs, and benefits of each option? And who would condemn the doctor for
choosing the cheapest alternative, one that has a much higher success rate than the most
expensive option, or, conversely, for choosing a more expensive alternative when it poses
a significantly diminished risk of death? We, of course, want and expect the
professionals to whom we have entrusted our lives and health to look at the pros and cons
of the various medical-care options. Similarly, there is nothing remiss or askew in also
wanting and expecting judges, those to whom we have entrusted decisions bearing on our
and others’ liberty, property, and safety, to carefully weigh the pros and cons of various
sentencing options.
There are those, however, who decry the overt and official importation of
comparative cost-risk information into sentencing decision making on the grounds that it
will lead to disparity in sentencing. The apparent concern is that one judge, when
sentencing, may factor the costs and risks in one way, another judge may accord differing
weight to the same costs and risks, and a third judge may ignore those costs and risks
altogether. However, concerns about unwarranted disparity due to the differential
treatment of a sentencing factor extend to all sentencing factors, not just financial costs
and recidivism risks. One judge, for example, may give more weight to a victim-impact
statement than another judge does in a case with almost identical facts. In the end,
concerns about disparity are not to be discounted, but their resolution must be addressed
through the structuring of the overall sentencing system rather than by precluding judges
from considering facts relevant to sentencing.
3. It is advisable and efficient for the financial costs and recidivism risks of
various sentencing options to be calculated by experts who then transmit this information
to a sentencing judge. It would be odd, after concluding that judges already do and
should consider the comparative cost-effectiveness of differing criminal sanctions, to bar
judges from receiving feedback to make that assessment process more accurate and
efficient. Insisting that judges can only conduct uninformed cost-benefit analyses
obviously would make no sense. So instead of requiring judges, who are not financial
analysts or criminologists, to individually calculate the financial costs of a particular
sentence or the recidivism risks it poses, Missouri, quite wisely in my opinion, remits
these calculations to the experts – the sentencing commission. But while the sentencing
commission is the number cruncher, the final decision as to what is a cost-effective and
just sentence in an individual case is left, as it should be, to the sentencing judge.
4. The consideration by judges of the costs and risks of the varied sanctions that
they could impose on a defendant comports with, and indeed furthers, sentencing
objectives, including retribution. One of the principal arguments propounded in
opposition to the practice of tendering cost-risk information to judges for their
consideration when crafting the most appropriate penalty in a case is that it undermines
sentencing objectives, particularly retribution. Opponents intone that judges are
supposed to select a sentence based on what a defendant deserves, not on what a sanction
costs. One could write an article, perhaps even a book, dissecting this argument and
refuting the assumptions on which it is grounded. But the following four points
particularly warrant highlighting now:

a. The notion that judges are only to focus on retribution – on “just deserts” –
when sentencing a defendant conflicts with the dictates of the sentencing
statutes to which judges are bound to adhere. For example, the federal
sentencing statute requires judges to consider a number of sentencing
purposes and factors when choosing a sentence, including what sentence is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve “adequate deterrence”
and to protect the public from future crimes committed by the defendant.1
b. The feedback mechanism in Missouri not only gives judges information about
the immediate fiscal costs of a sanction but also empirically validated data
about the benefits of that sanction, in terms of the likelihood that a defendant
subject to this penalty will not recidivate and be imprisoned. This latter
information can prove insightful as judges strive to comply with statutory
directives, like the one recounted above, to consider the effect of a sentence
on the defendant’s future propensity to commit a crime.
c. The concern that feedback tools like those utilized in Missouri will mark the
demise of retribution as a sentencing objective rests on several
misperceptions. Perhaps most fundamentally, those fretting about this
innovation overlook the truism that confinement is not the only way to exact
punishment for criminal misdeeds. Community sanctions can also serve
retributive aims; they can also be punishing, as legislatures themselves
recognize.2 If anyone doubts that proposition, I encourage that person to
volunteer to be subjected, even for two months, to electronically monitored
home confinement, GPS monitoring, intensive supervision probation, day
reporting, or any of a range of other sanctions that limit the relatively
unimpeded freedom that so many of us take for granted. So even if a
sentencing system were single-mindedly focused on securing “an eye for an
eye,” there are different ways, figuratively, to gouge out an eye, none of
which would be foreclosed by an informed cost-risk assessment.
d. Even if we were to assume that retribution is the end-all of sentencing (a
proposition with which I, a subscriber to the precepts of restorative justice,
emphatically disagree), a judge’s comparison of the costs and recidivism risks
of various sentences promotes, rather than detracts from, the retributive
objective. This objective, properly construed, is subject to what is known as
the “parsimony principle.”3 According to this principle, when judges are
deciding whether to imprison someone for a crime, they must apply the “least
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restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to achieve” penal purposes.4 Thus, if
a judge were to determine that a defendant’s crime was serious enough to
warrant either probation, accompanied by certain stringent conditions, for a
defined period of time, or imprisonment, the judge would typically be obliged,
under the parsimony principle, to impose the community sanction.
5. Judges’ consideration, at the time of sentencing, of reliable data about the
financial costs and recidivism risks of various sentencing alternatives does not usurp
legislative prerogatives. There has been much ado that the Missouri reform initiative
somehow encroaches on the dominion of legislators. I confess that, for me, this argument
is a head scratcher. Here’s why:
First, as noted earlier, informing judges about the costs and recidivism risks of
sentencing alternatives enables them to not only meet, but better meet, sentencing
objectives laid out by the legislature. Instead of, for example, deferring to the perhaps
unsubstantiated statements of a defense attorney, prosecutor, or probation official who
prepared the presentence report that a particular penalty will or will not promote the
rehabilitation or specific deterrence that will dissuade the defendant from committing
additional crimes in the future, a judge can consider, as one of many sentencing
considerations, whether the data indicate that these assertions are well grounded.
Second, it is the legislature itself that accords judges the sentencing discretion
whose exercise can affect the type of penalty to be imposed, its duration or amount, and
the conditions that will attend certain community sanctions. So when judges consider
facts that will allow them to choose which of the sentencing options authorized by the
legislature is, in a particular case, the most effective and fiscally responsible means of
implementing the legislatively prescribed sentencing objectives, the judges can hardly be
said to be flouting the will of the legislature or derogating its authority.
Third, the view that only legislatures should consider the sentencing implications
of cost-benefit assessments like those being instituted in Missouri overlooks one
ineluctable point: There are multiple individuals and entities involved in sentencing
decision-making processes. As the Supreme Court observed in Mistretta v. United
States, “the sentencing function long has been considered a peculiarly shared
responsibility among the Branches of government and has never been thought of as the
exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch.”5 The multiplicity of parties
making sentencing-related decisions often incorporate their perceptions about the
financial costs of sanctions and their impact on recidivism into those decisions. So even if
we were able – somehow, someway – to foreclose judges from undertaking cost-benefit
analyses when imposing sentences and even if we wanted – for some inexplicable reason
-- to foreclose them from identifying the most cost-effective way in an individual case to
fulfill sentencing objectives dictated by the legislature, the same cost-benefit assessments
would continue to be replayed in other realms outside the legislature. Perhaps most
4
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notably, such cost-benefit analyses would continue to pervade the shadow world that has
such a profound effect on sentences – the world of plea bargaining.
Fourth, I have heard some grumbling that the ostensible encroachment on the
legislative function that follows from judges’ consideration of financial costs and
recidivism risks may even abridge the constitutional separation of powers. Mistretta, in
my opinion, belies that argument. In that case, the Supreme Court rebuffed the
contention that the emplacement of the United States Sentencing Commission within the
judicial branch of the federal government violated the separation of powers. The Court
emphasized that Congress continued to be vested with the legislative authority to define
the “broad limits” of sentences – the minimum and maximum sentences that could be
imposed for a federal crime.6 Similarly, under the new informational construct in
Missouri, the state legislature continues to set the broad limits of sentences, and judges
continue to exercise the traditional judicial function of identifying the most appropriate
sentence within those limits.
6. The open dissemination of information to judges about the financial costs and
recidivism risks of differing sentencing options in a case will bring more transparency
and accountability into the sentencing process. “Transparency” and “accountability”
may be buzzwords to some, but I believe, and strongly so, in their inherent value – in
their importance to ethical and accurate decisions. So yes, I would opt for having a
sentencing commission make empirically validated information available to judges and,
in turn, the public about the financial costs and recidivism-reduction benefits of differing
sentencing options in a case. This practice is far preferable to having judges continue to
make sentencing-related decisions based on their own hunches and assumptions about
such costs and risks. Such decision making based on gut feelings inevitably yields
sentences that pose greater hazards to the public’s safety than would other sentences, are
a wasteful expenditure of the government’s limited resources, and unnecessarily curb
individual liberty.
____________________
I unabashedly favor endeavors, like the one in Missouri, to better inform judges’
sentencing decisions and to bring more transparency into the sentencing process.
Missouri, commendably, has provided a foundation upon which other jurisdictions can
now build as they develop further refined structures for collecting, disseminating, and
considering data about the financial costs and recidivism risks of the sentencing options
available to a judge in a particular case. Jurisdictions, for example, may develop costrisk matrixes that include even more sentencing alternatives than the “regular probation,”
enhanced-supervision probation, prison, and shock probation about which Missouri
judges can receive information.7 But however these structures are finetuned, Missouri
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5, at 2-3 (Aug. 17, 2010).
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has paved the way. Thankfully.

